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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 930612-CA
v.
RIO VISTA LIMITED, a Utah
Corporation dba MOAB U-SERVE
aka STARS FOOD STORE; LA SAL OIL
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, dba
GORDON'S SINCLAIR; STATE OF UTAH;
DEPENDABLE JANITORIAL SERVICE;
and JOHN DOES I-X,

Priority 15

Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee State of Utah does not object to the statement of
jurisdiction described by Appellant.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellee State of Utah concurs with Appellant that the
abuse of discretion standard applies to the granting of the Motion
to Dismiss for failure to prosecute.

However, in regard to

Appellant's sixth issue regarding the trial court's interpretation
of Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the
appropriate .standard of review is one of "correction of error".
Oner Int'l (U.S.A.) v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah
1993), citing State v. James. 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991).
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 12(e)# Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(Addendum "1")

Rule 41(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

(Addendum "2")

Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration

(Addendum "3")

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On June 22, 1988, Appellant filed a Complaint against the
State of Utah and others for damages related to its property in
Moab, Utah.

(R. 1-13).

2. On August 25, 1988, Appellee State of Utah filed a Motion
for More Definite Statement pursuant to Rule 12 (e) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure,
3.

(R. 41-43).

On September 26, 1988, Judge Bunnell, District Court

Judge, issued a "Ruling on Defendant, State of Utah's, Motion for
More Definite Statement."

(R. 52-53).

Said Ruling states that

"The Court grants the Motion and orders that the plaintiff file an
amendment to the pleadings . . .

. "

URCP Rule 12 (e) requires

that the amended complaint be filed within ten days or the court
may strike the pleading or "make such order as it deems just."
4. Said Ruling was mailed to counsel for the various parties
on September 26, 1988.
5.

No

Amended

(R. 53).
Complaint

was

filed.

Apparently,

by

Appellant's own admission, an amended complaint was actually even
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prepared by Appellant's counsel, Dale F. Gardiner, on or about
December 1, 1988, but such was never filed, and Appellee State of
Utah was not aware that such was drafted until it was presented as
an exhibit in the subject Motion to Dismiss proceeding in 1993.
(R. 242-253).
6.

In December,

bankruptcy.

1988, Appellant

apparently

filed

for

Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Withdrawal of

Counsel and Notice of Bankruptcy.

(R. 69) .

The Notice clearly

states that Dale F. Gardiner is withdrawing as counsel and that
,f

[c]ounsel for Hartford Leasing Corporation is George H. Speciale,

Esq... .» (R. 69).
7.

No Amended Complaint was filed from the date of the

Court's Ruling (September 26, 1988) to present.
8.

Apparently Appellant entered into a contingency fee

agreement with Steven C. Tycksen in early 1993 (presumably then,
before the Motion to Dismiss was filed).

(See Appellant's Brief at

24 and R. 284-286) .
9.

After four and one-half years, with no amended complaint

filed, Appellee State of Utah, on March 26, 1993, filed a Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice or Strike and Points
and Authorities.

(R. 71-75).

Said Motion indicated that URCP

12(e) required the conforming pleading to be filed within ten (10)
days or the court may make such order as it deems just.
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Additionally, URCP 41 (b) was cited as allowing for a dismissal for
lack of compliance with a court order.
10.

On April 7, 1993, Appellant, through attorney Steven C.

Tycksen, filed an objection to the Motion to Dismiss as well as a
seven-page memorandum opposing dismissal.

(R. 110-120) .

affidavit was also attached to the objection.
11.

An

(R. 121-125).

On April 19, 1993, Appellee State of Utah filed a Reply

in support of the Motion to Dismiss. (R. 136-139).
12. On June 7, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for
Decision stating that the Motion to Dismiss "is now at issue and
ready for decision of the Court."
13.

(R. 149-150).

On June 7, 1993, Appellant attempted to submit another

memorandum against the Motion to Dismiss.
14.

(R.

151-162) .

On July 15, 1993, Judge Anderson entered an Order of

Dismissal for Lack of Prosecution with Prejudice.
15.

On July 15, 1993, Appellant filed a nineteen-page

memorandum objecting to the order.
16.

(R. 167-169) .

(R. 175-196).

On July 19, 1993, District Court Judge Lyle R. Anderson

issued a "Ruling on Objections to Proposed Order" indicating that
the objection was filed too late (most of it was faxed after 5:00
p.m.). Despite procedural problems of considering the objections,
Judge Anderson also indicated that, in any event, the "supplemental
memoranda submitted by plaintiff before it filed the Notice to
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Submit for Decision would not have altered the Court's decision."
(R. 313-315)•
17.

Appellant appealed the Judge's Order of Dismissal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Judge Anderson properly found that the Appellant was not
prejudiced by any technical noncompliance with Rule 4-506(3) of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
Plaintiff had counsel before and during the Motion to Dismiss
proceeding.

The notice of withdrawal and indication of the

appointment of George H. Speciale as counsel for Hartford Leasing
Corporation (the Plaintiff) gave Defendants every indication that
Mr. Speciale was its counsel.
discretion.

Judge Anderson did not abuse his

To the contrary, it would have been an abuse of

discretion to allow a four and one-half year extension of time to
file an amended

complaint

after a motion for more definite

statement was granted.
URCP Rule 12 (e) allows the Court to take such action as it
"deems necessary".

This certainly can include a dismissal with

prejudice. URCP Rule 41 (b) also allows a dismissal with prejudice
for failure to comply with the Court.

Given the extremely long

period of failure to comply with the Court, such a dismissal with
prejudice was certainly not an abuse of discretion.
There was no abuse of discretion for not holding a hearing.
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Appellant waived this hearing in its Notice to Submit for Decision.
Appellant did not provide any argument in its Brief that Appellant
would have offered something at the hearing that the Judge had not
considered.

If there was any error here, it was harmless.

It

would have been an abuse of discretion not to grant Appellee's
Motion to Dismiss.
There was no abuse of discretion in the Judge's adherence to
the Court Rules regarding memoranda.

A page limit, for instance

would make no sense, if one can file as many memoranda as one
wishes.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
BY DISMISSING THE CASE FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION,
DESPITE ANY LACK OF SPECIAL NOTICE UNDER UTAH
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION RULE 4-506(3) .
Dale Gardiner filed a notice of withdrawal of counsel in
1988 after the Court required an amended complaint to be filed due
to the granting of a motion for more definite statement •

The

notice of withdrawal indicated that George H. Speciale was the new
counsel. Appellant contends that this indication of new counsel is
in the same paragraph as the bankruptcy notification and that
therefore one should interpret the notice as George H. Speciale
only being the counsel for bankruptcy.

This interpretation is

unreasonable. If Appellant was to be unrepresented in this matter,
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its withdrawing counsel should have been clearer.

Also, one can

interpret the notice as having an initial paragraph indicating that
Dale Gardiner was withdrawing and a second paragraph indicating the
remaining matters.
Appellant

is

arguing

that

failure

to

comply

with

a

notification requirement under Utah Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-506 (3),
trial court.

forever precludes any further proceedings by the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-506(3)

states that when an attorney withdraws from a case, the opposing
counsel must notify the unrepresented client in writing to obtain
other counsel or appear in person before further proceedings are
initiated by the opposing counsel.

The Rule further states that

"no further proceedings shall be held in the matter until 20 days
have elapsed from the date of filing."

It is a logical conclusion

from reading the Rule, that the intent is to avoid a situation
where an unrepresented person is facing proceedings without counsel
and to avoid a situation where any new counsel does not have at
least twenty days to prepare.
Appellant was represented by counsel before and during the
Motion to Dismiss proceeding and was not prejudiced by any
potential

"technical" violation of the

requirement".

"counsel notification

The record shows that the new counsel, Steven

Tycksen, was able to file extensive documents opposing the Motion
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to Dismiss.
Appellant's reliance on Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 583 (Utah
1984), is misplaced.

In Sperry, the Utah Supreme Court stated a

relationship between obedience with court rules and the abuse of
discretion standard.
prejudicial

Sperry. however, does not mean that non-

technical rule violations prohibit

proceeding in a matter.

a Court

from

The appropriate course for dealing with

any technical violation of the "counsel notification" rule is to
assure that the purpose of the rule is satisfied prior to any
action that may prejudice an unrepresented party's rights.
Even if there was a violation of the "counsel notification
requirement," it would have been an abuse of the Court's discretion
to not grant the Motion to Dismiss, where over four and one-half
years passed without the filing of an amended complaint, which was
required in order to prosecute the action.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE IT DISCRETION
IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS WHERE APPELLANT
HAD NOT FILED A REQUIRED AMENDED COMPLAINT IN OVER
FOUR AND ONE-HALF YEARS.
"The burden is on the party attacking a dismissal for failure
to prosecute

[to] offer a reasonable excuse for its lack of

diligence.'w

Country Meadows v. Department of Health, 851 P.2d

1212, 1215 (Utah App. 1993), quoting Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah
State Univ. . 813 P.2d 1216# 1218 (Utah App. 1991).
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The decision

of the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss should not be
interfered with unless the abuse of discretion is "clear." Country
Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1214, citing Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v.
Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah App. 1987), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987).
Here, there is no reasonable excuse for the Appellant to not
have filed an amended complaint for over four and one-half years
beyond the ten day time limit.

In fact, no amended complaint

against the State was ever served.

Appellant admits that an

amended complaint was prepared in 1988, but never filed.

(R. 242-

253) .
Appellant contends that the relevant factors enumerated in
Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1989) were not
met.

These factors include the conduct of the parties, opportunity

each party had to move the case forward, what each party did to
move it forward, prejudice, and injustice.
court

properly

considered

these

factors

However, the trial
and

concluded

that

dismissal was appropriate.
CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES AND WHAT EACH PARTY DID
In Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216, the Utah Court of
Appeals indicated that even though the defendant may not have moved
the case forward, the plaintiff had a duty to exercise due
diligence to prosecute its action.
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In this case, it would be

absurd for the State to prepare and file an amended complaint
against itself in order to move the case forward or even to request
that plaintiff prosecute the case against the public.
Certainly, as stated above, the Appellant should have been
able to serve

and file an amended complaint within the four and a

half years prior to the Motion to Dismiss.
PREJUDICE AND INJUSTICE
The State would be greatly prejudiced if the case were to move
forward.

In its original complaint, Hartford Leasing sought

damages for the defendant's alleged breach of a lease agreement.
The State vacated the subject building after employees became ill.
This could have been caused by one or many factors, including mold,
the gas plume, the carpet, etc.

The building has been sold and

alterations have occurred. It would be very difficult at this time
to establish the causes of the illness that occurred almost six
years ago.
Appellee is even prejudiced in trying to argue this factor.
Because no amended complaint was filed, no answer by the State has
been filed. Therefore, it is not documented in the record of this
case as to what the issues of the case will be. It is anticipated
that if the State had to file an answer to an extremely late
amended complaint, that the issues would not be limited to the gas
plume, but would likely include construction defects that may now
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have been altered in the building by the new owners.
When a District Court grants a Motion for More Definite
Statement and the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, and
over four and one-half years passes since the ten day deadline,
justice is served by dismissing the matter.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN GRANTING THE DISMISSAL AS APPELLANT HAD
NOT REACTIVATED THE CASE PRIOR TO ITS MOTION
TO DISMISS.
Appellant argues that it obtained new counsel and reactivated
the case, and therefore the case should not have been dismissed for
lack of prosecution.

However, there is nothing in the record of

this case showing any action of new counsel prior to the motion to
dismiss for lack of prosecution.

The new counsel (or perhaps any

of the attorneys that Appellant sought advice from over the past
five years, including Dale Gardiner) could have file an amended
complaint, but did not.
Appellant

misinterprets

the

case

of

Count ry Me adows v.

Department of Health, 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah App. 1993)•

Appellant

misconstrues this case when it argues that when a case is
reactivated

at

any

time, a motion

prosecution would be improper.
1216, the court made

to dismiss

for lack of

In Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at

it clear that where the

case

is not

reactivated prior to the dismissal motion, an attempt to reactivate
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the case after the dismissal motion does not make the dismissal an
abuse of discretion.
Even though Appellant had a contingency fee agreement with the
new counsel in this matter, prior to the filing of Appellee's
Motion to Dismiss on March 26, 1993 (R.285-287), the new counsel
did not file anything in the matter until April 7, 1993 (R. 110113) . Thus, Appellant had the opportunity to reactivate the case
prior to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss, but did not do so.
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court under these
circumstances.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE.
The court did not abuse its discretion by granting the
dismissal with prejudice.

The Appellant had not filed an amended

complaint in over four and one-half years.

URCP 12(e) allows the

court to "make such order as it deems just" when the Appellant is
more than ten (10) days late.

Certainly the great length of time

here indicates that the Court's order of dismissal with prejudice
was within the realm of reason under URCP 12(e) and not an abuse of
discretion.
This dismissal with prejudice is consistent with URCP Rule
4Kb) and the decision of the Utah courts supporting dismissals
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with prejudice.

County Meadows v. Department of Health, 851 P.2d

1212, 1217 (Utah App. 1993); Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237
(Utah App. 1989); and Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure Sports,
Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah App. 1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277
(Utah 1977).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
BY NOT HOLDING A HEARING WHEN THE
INDICATED THE MATTER WAS AT ISSUE
FOR DECISION AND APPELLANT OFFERS
AS TO HOW A HEARING MAY HAVE MADE

DISCRETION
APPELLANT
AND READY
NO ARGUMENT
A DIFFERENCE.

Appellant requested an oral argument at the time it responded
to the Motion to Dismiss on April 7, 1993.

(R. 112) . However, on

June 7, 1993 (two months later), Appellant served a "Notice to
Submit for Decision" which stated that the Motion for Dismissal "is
now at issue and ready for decision of the Court." (R. 149-150) .
The District Court interpreted the actions of Appellant as a
waiver of the hearing request.

(R. 313-314).

Appellant argues that a hearing may not be waived under Rule
4-501(3) (d)

of

the

Utah

Code

Appellant's argument is flawed.

of

Judicial

Administration.

Rule 4-501(3)(d) applies when a

request for hearing is "denied." The trial court did not deny the
request. The trial court ruled that Appellant waived the hearing.
It is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant
the motion to dismiss based upon a consideration of the court file
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and the memoranda of the parties, when the Appellant withdrew a
request for oral argument.
Even if the Appellant's special language in its Notice to
Submit for Decision was not a waiver of the hearing, Appellant has
failed to indicate any argument in its Brief as to how such lack of
hearing prejudiced the Appellant. See Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Additionally, since Appellant was over four and one-

half years late in complying with the Court decision in regard to
amending the Complaint, it would have been an abuse of discretion
for the Court to not grant the Motion to Dismiss, regardless of
whether there was a hearing.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DISALLOWING
THE APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
Appellant sought to file a Supplemental Memorandum opposing
the Motion to Dismiss after the Defendant had already submitted the
Reply regarding the Motion to Dismiss.
Rule 4-501 (1) (a) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
provides that the Memorandum in opposition to the Motion shall be
no longer than ten pages in length unless waived by order of the
Court.

The Rule also provides for one memorandum in opposition.

The Court appropriately interpreted Rule 4-501 and did not
commit any error in granting the Motion to Dismiss based upon only
having "one round" of memoranda.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee State of Utah respectfully
requests that this Court affirm the order of the Seventh Judicial
District Court which granted the Motion to Dismiss with prejudice.
DATED this 19th day of January, 1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
By
AL£tf S. BACHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellee State of Utah were mailed, first class, postage prepaid,
to the following on the 19th day of January, 1994:
Steven C. Tycksen
Attorney for Appellant
45 East Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
J. Michael Hansen
Attorney for Appellee La Sal Oil
Suitter, Axland, Armstrong & Hansen
175 South West Temple #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
H. James CIegg
Julianne Blanch
Attorneys for Appellee Rio Vista
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah/-) S4145
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM 1
Rule 12 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

35

XTTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12

outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties 6hall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (1M7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. Thefilingof a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(]) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff.
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ner, there was no abuse in the district court's to cross-examination, the purely specula^
denial of plaintiffs second motion. Hill v. need for a third witness did not entitle the 4>
Dickerson, 839 P2d 309 (Utah Ct App. 1992). fendant to the granting of a motion for com*
Need.
uance. State v. Humpherys, 707 ?J2d id
Where the defendant's counsel had three (Utah 1985).
weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the
^ . . mLAi w Thm4—5 ? «7a
BOJ^
9 ?M
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, m ^ 9 ™ ™ ° r l e y * ^^^
»
were actually present at trial and thus subject * u t a n iy'°>COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance ness in civil case, 15 AXJL3d 1272.
§ 1 et &eq.; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 76, 80, 83,
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
84.
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenm
C.J.S- —17 C J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; incurred by other party, 9 AJLR.4th 1144.
88 CJ.S. Trial !§ 18 to 35.
Key Numbers. — Continuance *» 1 etieq;
AJLR. — Admissions to prevent contin- Trial •» 1 to t>
uance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-

Rule 41. Dismissal of actions.
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof.
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) byfilinga stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.
(2) By order of court Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this
paragraph is without prejudice.
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff,
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the
plaintiff, the court shall makefindingsas provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an abjudication upon the merits.
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim,
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive
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To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, and all supporting
documentation. If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of the motion, the
moving party may notify the clerk to submit the matter to the court for
decision as provided in paragraph (l)(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five-day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
pf the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
•that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
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deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
ordered by the Court, or requested by the parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below.
(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition
to a motion may file a written request for a hearing.
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has
been authoritatively decided.
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party. When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time.
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing. Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No dispositive motions shall be heard after
that date without leave of the Court.
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily.
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel.
amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15, 1991)
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendaent rewrote this rule to such an extent that a
detailed description is impracticable.
The 1991 amendment deleted "and a copy of

the proposed order" following "supporting doclamentation" in Subdivision (1Kb) and made related stylistic changes and inserted "principal"
in Subdivision (3Kb).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

should have been given ten days to respond, as
prescribed by Subdivision (1Kb) of this rule.
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).

When rule applies.
Cited.
When rale applies.
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531
Because the defendants' Rule 56(e) objection
to the plaintiffs first affidavit was framed as a (Utah 1991); Lucero v. Warden of Utah State
•eparate, written motion to strike, the plaintiff Prison, 841 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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Defendants.

Defendant State of Utah ("Utah") has filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Hartford Leasing Corporation
("Hartford") with prejudice for failure to prosecute, pursuant to
Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. The other defendants, La Sal Oil Company
("La Sal11) and Rio Vista Oil Limited ("Rio Vista") have either
joined in or moved separately for the same relief. Hartford has
filed an objection and a supporting memorandum.
Hartford has also filed a supplemental memorandum, to
vhich La Sal responded with a motion to strike. The Court agrees
with La Sal that the rules do not provide for supplemental
memoranda. The motion to strike is accordingly granted and the
Court will not consider the arguments contained therein in its
decision.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Civil No. 880705692
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This action was filed in June 22# 1988, Rio Vista
answered on July 18, 1988. Utah responded on August 24, 1988,
with a Motion for More Definite Statement, which was granted.1
La Sal answered on December 7, 1988. On December 30, 1988,
counsel for Hartford filed a Withdrawal of Counsel and Notice of
Bankruptcy.

This document states that counsel for Hartford is

George H. Speciale; but from the context, it is not possible to
be sure whether Mr. Speciale was bankruptcy counsel or counsel in
this case. Certainly Mr. Speciale did not file a notice of
appearance in this case.
There is no question that, between December 30, 1988,
and the filing of the first motion to dismiss on March 29, 1993,
Hartford has done nothing to move this case forward.

It is

incumbent upon Hartford to explain why four years of inaction are
justified by a bankruptcy filing. Hartford has provided no
information about why this case could not have been pursued
during the bankruptcy, or even when the bankruptcy ended.2

It is

also incumbent upon Hartford, as plaintiff, to move a case
forward. That defendants have not pressed Hartford to pursue its
action during the last four years is no excuse for the failure of
Hartford to do so.
'Hartford has never filed the amended complaint required by this ruling.
*La Sal asserts, in its reply memorandum, that the bankruptcy was dismissed in October,
1990.

RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
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Hartford has presented no substantial explanation of
its failure to pursue this action. The Court is convinced, from
the evidence and arguments presented, that Hartford elected to
ignore this action, hoping that something would happen to make
prosecution of the case less expensive, or improve its chances of
success•
The defendants claim that they have suffered prejudice
because the passage of time has affected their ability to gather
evidence for the defense. The Court discounts some of those
claims because most of the defendants have had the opportunity
and the incentive to gather much of the same evidence in related
matters. However, the Court recognizes that witnesses become
less available as time passes and that some tests, particularly
on carpeting, cannot be performed now that the carpeting has been
replaced.
Hartford asserts that the failure of defendants to give
notice to appoint successor counsel or appear in person mandates
denial of the motion. The Court agrees that defendants did fail
to comply with Rule 4*506, Utah Code of Judicial Administration*
Given the ambiguity in the notice of withdrawal and the absence
of a notice of appearance by other counsel, the defendant should
have given a notice under Rule 4*506. However, the remedy for
such a failure is not necessarily denial of the motion. The
remedy is to grant Hartford sufficient time after a pleading is
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filed in violation of Rule 4-506 to obtain counsel and adequately
respond.

It is evident here that Hartford has had that

opportunity.
The motions to dismiss are granted.

Counsel for the

defendants are directed to prepare an order or orders for
execution by the Court.
DATED this \^\^Y

day of June* ,1993.

yle R. Anderson, District Court Judge
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HARTFORD LEASING CORPORATION,
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RIO VISTA OIL LIMITED, a
Utah corporation, dba MOAB
U-SERVE, aka STARS FOOD STORE,
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ORDER OF DISMISSAL
FOR LACK OF
PROSECUTION WITH
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Civil No, 880705692
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.
After review of the pleadings and filings of counsel in
this matter and upon receipt of the Notice to Submit for Decision,
and good cause appearing therefore, it is therefore ORDERED that:
1.

The Motions to Dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff

Hartford Leasing

Corporation

("Hartford") with prejudice for

.failure to prosecute, pursuant to Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., are hereby
granted.

The entire complaint of Plaintiff is hereby dismissed

with prejudice against all Defendants.

The Motions to Dismiss

include the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant State of Utah,
Defendant La Sal Oil Company ("La Sal") and as joined by Defendant
Rio Vista Oil Limited. Hartford filed an objection and supporting
memorandum.

Defendant State of Utah ("State") and Defendant

La Sal filed a reply.
2.

Hartford also filed a supplemental memorandum.

Defendant State and Defendant La Sal filed a motion to strike the
supplemental memorandum.

This is based on the determination that

the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501, does not
provide for supplemental memoranda and the motion to strike is
accordingly granted and the Court did not consider the arguments
contained in the supplemental memoranda in its decision.
3.

This Order is based upon the Court's "Ruling on

Motion to Dismiss", dated June 21, 1993,^on file herein, and hereby
incorporated by reference.
4. Each party is responsible for its own costs and fees
incurred in this matter.
DATED this

/fT/A day of July, 1993

l.td^U.

rable Lyle R. Anderson
f t r i c t Court Judge
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Plaintiff filed Hartford Leasing's Objection to
Proposed Order dated July 15, 1993, by beginning a facsimile
transmission at 4:58 p.m., which ended at 5:10 p.m.

The Court

had already signed the Order of Dismissal with instructions to
file it if no objection was received on July 15, 1993. That
order was filed before the facsimile transmission was received.
Plaintiff asks the Court to set aside its ruling for
several reasons.
It is true -that plaintiff requested oral argument when
it filed its original memorandum in opposition to the motion to
dismiss. Under Rule 4*501, plaintiff would have been entitled to
oral argument.

However, plaintiff thereafter filed a Notice to

Submit for Decision that reads in full as follows:

RULING ON OBJECTIONS
TO PROPOSED ORDER
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Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for
Dismissal filed with the Court on or near the 7th
day of April, 1993, by Steven C. Tycksen, Attorney
for Plaintiff, is now at issue and ready for
decision of the Court,
The natural interpretation of this notice is that
nothing remained to be done before the Court rendered a decision,
and that plaintiff had waived its right to oral argument. The
Court accordingly ruled without oral argument.
Plaintiff now presents evidence, or at least argument,
about additional efforts it made to push this case toward a
resolution.

The Court cannot consider these arguments or

evidence. They should have been presented before the motions
were submitted for decision.
The Court reaffirms its ruling that supplemental
memoranda are not permitted.

Even if they were permitted, the

supplemental memoranda submitted by plaintiff before it filed the
Notice to Submit for Decision would not have altered the Court's
decision.
Rule 41, U.R.C.P. clearly states that dismissals for
failure to prosecute are with prejudice unless the Court otherwise specifies*

This Court specifically states that this

dismissal is with prejudice.
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Plaintiff's objection is accordingly overruled and the
dismissal is confirmed.
DATED the 19th day of July, 1993.

' L ///„
Lyfe R. Anderson, District Court Judge
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